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Scholars, lawyers, and activists have wondered for a decade or more whether
either or both the National Labor Relations Act and employment law models of
workplace protection, and the mix of private and public social insurance on which
they depend, are viable in the twenty-first-century economy. Wealth inequality
grows, real wages stagnate for all but the very top of the income distribution,
unemployment and underemployment are endemic, and wage and hour violations,
health and safety hazards, and other forms of exploitation are pervasive in the lowwage economy. Moreover, the U.S. economy is flooded with consumer goods
produced under even worse conditions all around the world. Existing models of
labor and employment regulation appear unable to guarantee safe and rewarding
working conditions to millions of workers in the United States and in the global
supply networks. While unionization has been demonstrated to reduce wage
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inequity and increase health and safety compliance, and has the promise of reducing
arbitrary or discriminatory practices and enhancing self-determination, private
sector union density appears unlikely to top ten percent of the workforce in the
foreseeable future. Alternative forms of collective action by workers face organized
legal opposition. Supreme Court decisions upholding class action waivers and
narrowing systemic disparate treatment employment discrimination claims cast
doubt on the future of collective litigation as a device to effect workplace
transformation. If individual negotiation and command and control regulation
cannot ensure decent work for many, and if collective action by workers is the rarity
rather than the norm, and is under legal attack where it exists, what alternatives are
there?
This symposium was organized to consider those alternatives. There have
been other symposia on critiques and the future of labor law and, to a lesser extent,
employment law. A group of eminent and rising scholars were invited to address
fundamental questions: What are the alternatives to the Wagner Act model of
majority unions, workplace collective bargaining, and the current regime of social
welfare provision on which it depends? What institutional structures could be
created to provide dignity, opportunity, and protection to work? Rather than
focusing on the current regime, the authors were challenged to explore alternatives
and not to take anything for granted, including the existing divisions between or
structures of labor law and employment law.
The articles explore a variety of alternative legal and social regimes based in
existing practice in the United States—including the hybrid union-communityworker organizations like Our Walmart and Fast Food Forward, sector-based
worker groups like the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, Occupy
initiatives, workers’ centers, national progressive organizations like the National
Employment Law Project, and community organizations like the Asian Pacific
American Legal Center. Some are based on comparative studies, examining
possibilities of creating in the United States institutional structures that show
promise elsewhere in the world. Some generalize from careful studies of particular
campaigns or organizations, with an eye toward scaling up successful efforts. Some
examine different legal regimes—the First Amendment freedom of assembly clause,
for example—and some examine different forms of representation and institutional
structures, including worker centers. Some explore feasible legal strategies to
address the marginalization of unauthorized migrant workers. Others propose legal
reforms to invigorate private membership organizations that protect the interests
of people at work, such as by reducing restrictions on the collection of voluntary
political contributions through payroll deduction and liberating unions from some
of the restrictions imposed by state right-to-work legislation.
The articles that appear in print in this issue are only a part of the larger
conversation that the symposium actually sparked. The live symposium featured a
convening of lawyers and activists working with unions, worker centers, and other
worker organizations across the United States. Some sessions were organized
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thematically and, although they did not produce written papers, they produced
insightful discussions. One such session focused on new initiatives and challenges
for organizing and representing workers in nontraditional work relations at the highand low-end of the pay spectrum. It featured a discussion among the General
Counsel of the Service Employees International Union, a lawyer who worked with
Fast Food Forward, and the General Counsel of the Writers Guild of America,
West. That panel revealed surprising similarities between efforts to organize lowwage and immigrant workers and efforts to collect residual payments for writers of
American film and TV programs that are shown, downloaded, or streamed online
around the world. In addition, lawyer-activists participated on panels with paper
authors, serving as discussants to bring an on-the-ground perspective to the ideas
essayed in the papers. The printed articles are, in my mind, much the better for the
critical engagement with the activists. As good as they are, though, the printed
papers suggest Plato’s allegory of the cave: they are the shadows on the wall and do
not fully capture the richness of discussions that occurred at the live symposium. I
am extremely grateful to Professor Sameer Ashar for collaborating in the
conceptualization of the overlap of the academic and activist meetings and for
assembling a superb group of lawyers, and I and all the article authors are grateful
to the many lawyers and activists who read drafts and participated in the discussions.
The articles in this symposium collectively argue three important propositions.
First, collective activism will be crucial to any revitalization of labor. Labor law
reform should aspire to enable the organizing that is essential to effective collective
activism. Each of the papers proposes a different way that law can either facilitate
such organizing and activism or avoid thwarting it. Second, and related, institutional
design matters a great deal to whether worker activism will occur and, if it does
occur, whether it will be effective in improving working conditions. Third, legal
rules should be crafted to facilitate collective worker action by making worker
collectives sustainable and scalable institutions; by giving them crucial roles in
existing legal regimes to empower worker voice in many important legal and political
forums; by leveraging power at the local, state, and national level; and by thwarting
efforts to use legal doctrines like preemption or legal bureaucracies like criminal
justice to eviscerate organizing gains.
The third step of the argument is where the authors strike out on four different
but intersecting paths. The paths are: (1) empowering collectives, especially at the
local level; (2) creating mechanisms to enhance leverage through local, national, and
international frameworks; (3) improving access to information to enhance worker
power; and (4) strengthening the institutional power of unions by protecting the
ability of unions and worker collectives to fund their operations. The first two of
these offer macro perspectives on how law facilitates and thwarts worker activism.
The third and fourth examine the ways that law creates (or destroys) the institutional
frameworks that empower workers to act collectively in organizing, in negotiating
and administering agreements over conditions of employment, and in political
action.
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I. EMPOWERING COLLECTIVES
In one way or another, many of the articles in this issue were written, or at
least imagined, in the shadow of the Occupy Movement and the ongoing series of
one-day strikes, marches, rallies, and other actions of Fast Food Forward, Our
Walmart, and Warehouse Workers United. Though, by 2013, Occupy seemed to
have fizzled as a movement, the fact that workers and students had—in this
contemporary period of apathy—become so fed up with rising inequality that they
would find common cause and form a recognizable nationwide movement was too
important—too hope inspiring—to ignore, even if the fizzling meant that no one
could build a law reform proposal around it. The activism around low-wage and
erratic part-time work in the fast food industry and at all parts of Walmart’s supply
chain also inspires scholars to think about what legal regime will protect worker
demands for improved conditions even when it is apparent that there is no realistic
near-term prospect of majority bargaining. Many of these articles essay ideas about
the kinds of legal theory and institutional structures it will take to make the next
such uprising a catalyst of legal and institutional change.
Chris Tilly and Marie Kennedy offer a vision of worker activism drawn from
their interviews with new left activists in South America in 2002–2009 and activists
in the housing rights movement in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.1 The
Latin American Third Left movement, like the U.S. housing rights movement and
the Occupy Movement, are and were characterized by bottom up decision making,
autonomy from the state, and pursuit of claims on territory by direct action.2 Tilly
and Kennedy consider the legal and social movement strategies that could make
such an approach feasible in the American workplace. They make it seem plausible
to imagine a synthesis between the recent labor activism of Latin America and the
earlier similar types of activism around housing in the United States and to explore
the ways in which such activism might change labor law.
In Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, Marion Crain and Ken Matheny
argue that a wide swath of American law of work (not just labor law) has become
hostile to group rights and they propose that robust legal protection for workers’
mobilization can be found in the freedom of assembly clause of the First
Amendment.3 Drawing on recent constitutional scholarship arguing for a revived
focus on freedom of assembly (not freedom of speech), Crain and Matheny remind
us that in the period of vibrant union and leftist activism in the 1930s and 1940s the
right to assemble was the crucial protection for unions and other groups seeking to
empower the dispossessed.4 Noting the correlation between the decline of labor
and the decline of independent constitutional protection for assembly (as opposed
1. Chris Tilly & Marie Kennedy, Latin America’s “Third Left” Meets the U.S. Workplace: A Promising
Direction for Worker Protection?, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2014).
2. Id. at 539.
3. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 561, 564 (2014).
4. See id. at 561, 564, 571–76.
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to associational speech), Crain and Matheny propose four respects in which
assembly rights should be “revived and harnessed in lieu of speech rights.”5 First,
the right of assembly should protect the process of forming and maintaining
groups.6 Second, the greatest First Amendment assembly rights should be conferred
on groups that challenge prevailing consensus norms.7 Third, assembly rights
should extend to “all forms of peaceable group action, including nonphysical
gatherings and assemblies for the purpose of litigation.”8 And fourth, the
constitutional protection for assembly should focus on the assembly itself, rather
than on the speech or message of those who assemble.9 In doctrinal terms, their
theory would extend constitutional protection to a variety of labor and worker
group strategies and practices that are currently illegal or unprotected by law,
including recognitional, organizational, and secondary picketing and boycotts,
strikes, union-funded or class action litigation, members-only bargaining, and union
appeals to workers at the worksite.
Lance Compa’s Not Dead Yet: Preserving Labor Law Strengths While Exploring New
Labor Strategies reminds us of the value and potential of existing labor law to protect
at least certain forms of local activism, as well as the political impossibility of radical
federal legislative reform in the foreseeable future.10 It describes significant recent
organizing successes in NLRB-supervised elections in many industries, including
among school bus drivers and nurses.11 It lists small-scale legal changes that might
make a big difference. And it makes the same point as many articles in the
symposium: unions are almost alone among worker collectives in having become
“enduring organizations with experienced leadership and secure financing,”12 and
that the challenges of creating and maintaining such sustainable institutions are
daunting.
A number of the articles address the aspirations of the Crain-Matheny, TillyKennedy, and Compa articles for more robust collective labor activism by
describing the institutional conditions that have led or can lead to it. The most
detailed such account is offered by Scott Cummings in his article Preemptive Strike:
Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks, which was part of the live symposium but,
because of its encyclopedic length, will appear as a following issue of this law
review.13 One of his signature case studies of low-wage worker organizing in
Southern California, his article describes the evolution of the economic structure

5. See id. at 597–98.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 598.
8. Id. (citation omitted).
9. Id.
10. See Lance Compa, Not Dead Yet: Preserving Labor Law Strengths While Exploring New Labor Law
Strategies, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 610–12 (2014).
11. See id. at 614–15.
12. Id. at 622.
13. See Scott L. Cummings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks, 4 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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and working conditions at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. It is an
exhaustively researched and extremely detailed account of the economic structure
of transport of goods from the ports to distribution centers sixty miles away. On
the basis of this sophisticated account of the sector, Cummings builds a rich analysis
of the political and legal strategy developed by labor and environmental groups to
improve air quality in the region and working conditions for the truckers by using
the City of Los Angeles’ control over all port business (the ports are city property
and, therefore, shippers are technically a sort of city contractor) as a site of leverage.
In response to a long and ongoing organizing campaign among truckers to improve
their working conditions, the city imposed requirements on the shippers that they
employ truckers rather than use independent contractors in order to internalize the
full costs of maintaining the fleet of trucks, labor, and pollution into the cost of
transporting the goods.14 The strategy achieved legislative success and seemed like
a solution to the poor labor and environmental conditions, until the trucking
companies got the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court to hold the law preempted by federal law.15 As Cummings points out, the
port causes pollution and other negative externalities and the city has the political
will to force the companies to internalize these costs, but the federal courts held
that the city lacks the authority to act.16 Congress has the authority, but lacks the
political will.17 Labor advocates, Cummings says, resorted to “Plan B”: suing
companies that misclassify drivers as independent contractors in order to prevent
them from shifting the fixed cost of running a trucking business (maintaining a fleet
of nonpolluting trucks) onto their workers, and then organizing drivers and
increasing union density one company at a time.18
The tension between national and local strategies for harnessing law to
leverage organizing power charted out in the Tilly-Kennedy and Cummings articles
is exemplified in thinking about labor organizing among unauthorized immigrant
workers. Here, Jayesh Rathod and Stephen Lee illustrate the challenges facing
immigrant worker activists. Like Cummings, Rathod and Lee see law as a site of
leverage for both workers and employers. And all three scholars recognize that both
worker advocates and employer lawyers see local, state, and national legislation as
weapons in the fight to raise or lower labor standards and costs, and a victory for
one side in one forum is likely to provoke an effort by the other side to gain the
advantage through legislation or litigation at another level of government.
Jayesh Rathod argues in Riding the Wave: Uplifting Labor Organizations Through
Immigration Reform that comprehensive immigration reform provides an opportunity
to “position[ ] unions and worker organizations as key actors in immigration
processes” by, for example, specifying in the legislation that they can play a role in
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See id.
See id. (discussing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013)).
See id.
See generally id.
See id.
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sponsoring visa applications, facilitating the portability of employment-related visas,
training people to meet immigration requirements, and assisting with legalization
applications and integration programs.19 A major regulatory trend has been to
harness private institutions for various legal administrative processes. For example,
employers are required by the Family and Medical Leave Act and many other
statutes to notify employees of their statutory rights.20 They are required by the
Supreme Court’s workplace harassment jurisprudence and by some state laws to
make efforts to prevent and redress harassment through training and
whistleblowing programs.21 Unions are required by the Court’s union dues
jurisprudence to notify employees of their rights to opt out of payment of union
dues and to maintain administrative structures to handle dues objections.22 These
are just a few examples of the many ways in which statutes and judicial decisions
have required private organizations to develop policies and procedures to comply
with legal mandates and have taken the existence of an internal procedure as partial
compliance with a substantive mandate.23 One consequence of such legal provisions
is to institutionalize the human resources department as a powerful entity within the
firm.24 Rathod’s proposal similarly would institutionalize unions, worker centers,
and other worker groups as—perhaps—powerful entities within the massive
immigration apparatus. Institutionalizing unions and worker groups in this role also
provides immigrant workers opportunities for leadership development, information
about legal rights, a community of similarly situated people, and assimilation into
American society. Because immigration law is national, but is implemented locally,
Rathod’s proposal envisions a way that immigrant worker organizations can be
made players in national policymaking while also remaining deeply rooted in local
policy implementation.
Stephen Lee examines the relationship between the local and the national in
the legal regulation of labor markets for immigrant low-wage workers from the
other end of the telescope, as it were. In Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market,
Lee questions the wisdom of using criminal law enforced by local police as a strategy

19. Jayesh M. Rathod, Riding the Wave: Uplifting Labor Organizations Through Immigration Reform, 4
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 625, 625 (2014).
20. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 109, 29 U.S.C. § 2619 (2012).
21. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(a) (West 2011) (requiring employers with fifty or more
employees to provide “at least two hours of classroom or other effective interactive training and
education regarding sexual harassment to all supervisory employees in California”); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758, 765
(1998).
22. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 (1988); Chi. Teachers Union,
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 (1986); Cal. Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 230–31
(1995) (detailing the procedures unions must follow to notify employees of their rights to refuse to pay
union dues or full fees and the processes unions must use to handle employee objections).
23. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 75–88 (2010).
24. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 892, 898 (2011).
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to address the pervasive problem of wage theft.25 Wage theft is endemic in the lowwage labor market: some studies of employment in major urban areas have found
that workers who experienced wage violations lost over twelve percent of their
weekly pay to unlawful failures to pay wages.26 Labor activists have grown frustrated
with the inefficacy of state and federal legal enforcement, and their pleas to do
something about weak or nonexistent civil remedies for wage theft have persuaded
local governments to enact and local police to enforce laws making it a crime to fail
to pay earned wages.27 As Lee explains, the allure of local criminal law and the local
police for labor activists is that they can work: calling the police doesn’t require an
immigrant day laborer to hire a lawyer, produce pay stubs, figure out which
corporate entity was the legal employer, and navigate the mysteries of an
understaffed and overwhelmed local court or state labor commission.28 A credible
complaint to the police may be all it takes to launch an investigation against a flyby-night landscaping service, construction contractor, or carwash operator that
employed the complaining worker, and an arrest or the filing of criminal charges by
the local prosecutor may be all it takes to spur the recalcitrant employer into paying
back wages. Local governments and law enforcement officials feel they are doing
something good for the community. Businesses that compete in the labor market
and that do pay all workers feel that their unscrupulous competitors lose their
competitive advantage. It’s a win-win-win. Except, as Lee explains, local police are
now encouraged and, using fingerprints, required to provide information about
every arrested person to a federal database which then automatically cross-checks
the worker’s information against a Department of Homeland Security database with
immigration-related information.29 Thus, “even minimal contact with the police can
lead to removal,” which discourages workers from contacting the police and, even
if the victim of wage theft has no reason to fear arrest and is confident the police
will not mistakenly arrest him, he may be unwilling to take action against an
immigrant employer.30 The theft of a week’s wages is catastrophic for a worker
living in poverty, but he may nevertheless be unwilling to launch a criminal
investigation that will result in the removal of an employer.
The complex interweaving of local and federal law, the ways that interaction
affects worker activism, and the incentives it creates for advocates of both labor and
management are major themes in contemporary labor law. The dynamic one may

25. Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656–58
(2014).
26. See RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR R ESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T, WAGE
THEFT AND WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOR LAW FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 4 (2010).
27. See Lee, supra note 25, at 656.
28. See id. at 657.
29. Id. at 667; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1582–86 (2010); Adam B. Cox &
Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 94–95 (2013).
30. Lee, supra note 25, at 668.
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discern through reading the Cummings, Rathod, and Lee articles together is that a
regulatory gain obtained by one side at the local level will spur the other to challenge
it as preempted by federal legislation. This is the story of the clean trucks campaign
in Los Angeles and also the story of local measures banning the employment of
unauthorized immigrants. A perceived regulatory failure at the federal level—
whether the failure to enforce minimum wage laws or to enforce prohibitions on
unauthorized migration—will inspire a campaign for local regulation. The loser in
that local campaign will turn to federal law and argue that the local regulation is
preempted.31 Judicial decisions on preemption tend to track the judges’ policy views
about the desirability of the regulation in question, as scholars have argued for years
that federalism arguments have been used as a purportedly value-neutral cover for
decisions reached on other grounds. This dynamic has been going on for a century
and under the analytical framework of laissez-faire economic substantive due
process, labor preemption of state laws prohibiting union activity, Civil Rights Act
preemption of laws allowing racial discrimination, ERISA preemption of laws
mandating or regulating pensions and health benefit plans, Immigration and
Nationality Act preemption of regulation of immigrant labor, and so on.32 There is
no reason to expect that the fight between local and national authority to make
workplace policy will change.
II. ENABLING LABOR TO USE LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVERAGE
(WITHOUT MANAGEMENT THWARTING LABOR GAINS)
Although all of the first group of articles recognize that effective collective
action is always to some extent a local phenomenon and that bottom-up organizing
is a necessary foundation for any powerful national worker movement, national and
international connections are necessary to obtain leverage and to create a sustainable
force even in the local economy. The articles by Matthew Dimick and César Rosado
Marzán provide rich theoretical and empirical analyses, based on sophisticated
interdisciplinary and international comparative research, of structural features that
American unions require to operate effectively in the global economy.
In Productive Unionism, Matthew Dimick argues that centralization of bargaining
is necessary for union strength.33 After tracing the origin of centralized bargaining

31. In California, for example, concerns about the inadequacies of the federal and state
minimum wage laws prompted many localities to enact their own living wage laws, which in turn
prompted business interests to file litigation arguing that localities lack authority under state law to
regulate wages. The California Legislature enacted California Labor Code section 1205, which
empowers local governments to enact labor legislation that is more employee-protective than state law.
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1205(c) (West 2011) (“[L]abor standards established by the local jurisdiction . . .
shall take effect . . . so long as those labor standards are not in explicit conflict with, or explicitly
preempted by, state law.”).
32. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Anti-Subordination Principle of Labor and Employment Law Preemption,
5 HARV. L. & POL’ Y REV. 17, 18–19 (2011) (describing preemption arguments in labor, immigration,
and civil rights law).
33. Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 681 (2014).
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in Europe, Dimick explains how greater centralization of bargaining—at the
industry or sector level rather than at the workplace level—enables unions to
respond more efficiently to labor market risk (by enabling workers to obtain
reemployment after economic change causes job loss). Centralized bargaining
allows unions to cooperate with employers in investing in productivity enhancement
and human capital development.34 Dimick also contends that centralized bargaining
tends to reduce employer opposition to unions by taking wages out of competition
and by enabling employers to capture the productivity gains from greater workplace
flexibility and investment in human and physical capital.35 Interestingly, Dimick
argues that decentralized bargaining in the United States is neither caused nor
compelled by the National Labor Relations Act and, therefore, “currently existing
labor law probably does not place that many constraints on efforts to reform the
nature of union and bargaining organization.”36
César Rosado Marzán explores the local, national, international issue through
his study of four cases in which American workers create organizing leverage
through International Framework Agreements (IFAs). In his ambitious empirical
study, Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An Exploratory Study, Rosado
Marzán explores the question of whether IFAs promising employer neutrality
concerning unionization facilitate unionization.37 He describes organizing
campaigns at the U.S. operations of four different multinational corporations that
had signed IFAs: security services firms Securitas and Group 4 Securicor, and
automakers Daimler and Volkswagen.38 He finds the unionization gains to be quite
modest. Each one of these is an interesting case study, and Rosado Marzán’s
approach contrasts nicely with that of Tilly and Kennedy in that Rosado Marzán
focuses his interview research on corporate leaders and they focuses theirs on labor
activists; read together, the articles show that different methodologies are different
paths to similar findings about the possibilities of organizing strategies. In the
context of an article about whether an institutional structure—an international
agreement between a multinational corporation and a European labor
organization—Rosado Marzán also shows that local culture and the particular
structure of an industry still matter. As he explains, in the security services industry,
unionized service providers must constantly face the threat of replacement of their
company (and its higher wage, unionized labor force) by lower-cost nonunion
competitors.39 The threat of labor substitution has long been a formidable obstacle
to organizing labor supplied through labor contractors in the service,
manufacturing, garment, and agricultural industries. Even in the automotive

34. Id. at 694–98.
35. Id. at 698–700.
36. Id. at 702–03.
37. César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An Exploratory
Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. R EV. 725, 725, 770–71 (2014).
38. Id. at 729.
39. Id. at 750.
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industry, in which replacement of a unionized contractor with a nonunion
contractor is not a threat, the local political culture of hostility to unions by
management, labor, and elected officials and the dearth of comparably high-wage
jobs makes unionization a tough sell to workers.
Although the organizational gains under these four IFAs were modest, Rosado
Marzán argues that they could be the basis for formation of members-only unions.
His analysis predicts the development of members-only unions at European car
manufacturing plants in the American South, an exciting development in the history
of American unions.40 The international union could impose by contract a
requirement that the employer bargain with a minority union, could also give the
minority union the right to strike, and could waive the employer’s right to sue for
violations of secondary boycott laws. Such IFAs, Rosado Marzán argues, would
“need to be policed by the unions and works councils in the home countries of the
signatory firms,” which would empower minority unions through global solidarity.41
III. PROVIDING INFORMATION AND OPPORTUNITIES
TO CHOOSE COLLECTIVE ACTION
A third approach to reimagining labor law is to build the power of worker
collectives through institutionalizing practices that enable worker activism. Two
specific proposals are made here. Cynthia Estlund proposes mandatory disclosure
of salary and wage information.42 Michael Oswalt proposes annual elections for
workers to select bargaining representatives.43 Each of these proposals to enhance
transparency and to increase possibilities for meaningful employee engagement and
collective action in the workplace may increase the likelihood that unions will be
important institutions in governing the workplace.
In Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, Cynthia
Estlund expands on her previous argument that effective regulation of the
workplace and efficient operation of labor markets require mandatory public
disclosure of accurate information about working conditions.44 In this article, she
explores the application of her theory about transparency to the case of pay, which
she had set aside in the earlier article because of the difficulty of the issue.45 She
acknowledges the controversy that would surely surround any proposal to require
disclosure of employees’ wages and salaries to coworkers and to the public, but finds
that pay transparency has potential benefits in promoting enforcement of legal
mandates about discrimination and wage and hour laws. Transparency might also

40. Id. at 778–79.
41. Id. at 730.
42. Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 781, 782–83 (2014).
43. Michael M. Oswalt, Automatic Elections, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 801, 804 (2014).
44. Estlund, supra note 42, at 781–83; see also Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace
Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 355 (2012).
45. Estlund, supra note 42, at 782; see also Estlund, supra note 44, at 365 n.46.
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improve the operation of labor market by enabling employees to assess their
situation in their current job and their prospects for advancement within the firm
or for switching firms, and it might promote corporate social responsibility with
respect to pay equity as well as overall pay amounts. Importantly, for purposes of
the theme of this segment of papers, “information about salaries—their overall level
as well as the rationality and fairness of salary disparities—might be relevant to an
employee’s decision whether to support unionization.”46 Assessing the case for pay
secrecy, Estlund notes the difficulty and complexity of determining the
consequences of salary transparency and acknowledges the legitimate objections to
it. Nevertheless, she asserts pay transparency likely would promote pay equity and
fairness; workers “seem to prefer greater wage equality and perhaps greater wage
transparency, and attempt to seek both when they have the collective economic
power to do so,” which is why unionized workplaces tend to have greater wage
compression than nonunion workplaces.47
In Automatic Elections, Michael Oswalt responds to the familiar argument that
labor law fails workers by pointing out that the legal regime was built to contain
extreme worker agitation in an era in which it was reasonable to assume that labor
activism would “push labor law’s core procedural process along its way.”48 Now, he
contends, in the absence of powerful worker activism, the law is “a cage built for a
lion that instead confines a lamb.”49 Observing that the existing electoral machinery
does not serve workers and is embraced by management mainly for its power in
thwarting unionization, and that alternative organizing options are inadequate and
legally precarious, Oswalt argues that regular union authorization elections will serve
the purposes of the NLRA, will have “culturally transformative potential,” and
could be implemented with relatively modest statutory and regulatory changes.50
Oswalt envisions “[t]housands of secret ballot contests held all over the country”;
labor board election results would be published in newspapers like baseball box
scores; television news would report unionization election results at behemoth New
Economy companies like Microsoft and Google; all of this would “represent a
momentous change: American life reinfused with the talk—and even the
expectation—of collective workplace activism.”51 His article has already sparked
debate among labor scholars about whether reducing the barriers to union elections
will result in more unions winning or losing bargaining rights. This is an important
debate to have, and only if labor is willing to risk losing will it have the chance to
make significant gains.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Estlund, supra note 42, at 788.
Id. at 795.
Oswalt, supra note 43, at 803.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805, 842–46.
Id. at 841.
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IV. PROTECTING THE INSTITUTIONAL POWER OF UNIONS
The final two articles in the symposium address the institutional power of
worker collectives. Unlike the other articles in this symposium, which focus on
union power vis-à-vis employers, these articles focus on union power vis-à-vis their
members. Unlike most other worker collectives, which are subject to the rise and
fall of voluntary contributions of time and money from workers, unions have
developed a powerful national institutional presence and a model for sustaining
themselves through automatic dues collection through payroll deduction. For over
fifty years, the National Right to Work Committee (NRTWC) has waged a litigation
and lobbying campaign to limit the ability of unions and both private sector and
governmental employers to agree to union security provisions in collective
bargaining agreements and to restrict the collection of union dues.52 Although
framed as a civil rights campaign to protect the rights of dissident workers in
unionized workplaces, NRTWC is financed by business and employer
organizations.53 Whatever the benefits to workers of laws limiting the ability of
unions and employers to agree to contracts providing for the collection of dues
through payroll deduction, or for employees to be required to pay dues or fees for
the union’s representation services, such laws have the obvious benefit to employers
by limiting union fundraising. Not coincidentally, business groups favor them
because they limit the power of unions in both workplace negotiations and in local,
state, and national political forums.
In Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, Benjamin Sachs and I argue for a
reinterpretation of the relationship between federal and state law on the ability of
unions to collect money from the employees they represent to defray the cost of
services they provide.54 Because a union has a duty under federal law to represent
all employees in the bargaining unit, we contend, the union should also have a right
to negotiate an agreement with the employer requiring employees to pay for the
services the union is required by law and contract to provide.55 In the twenty-four
states that have enacted so-called “right-to-work” laws, we assert there is an inequity
in requiring unions to provide services to employees but prohibiting the union from
charging employees for those services.56 We propose three alternative approaches
to resolving the inequity: (1) reinterpret the provision of federal law that allows
states to pass right-to-work laws to prohibit agreements under which nonmembers
are compelled to pay fees lower than what union members pay; (2) allow unions in

52. See About NRTWC, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, http://nrtwc.org/about-2/
(last visited March 14, 2014) (describing the history and mission of the NRTWC).
53. See, e.g., Al Shaw et al., How Dark Money Flows Through the Koch Network, PROPUBLICA (Feb.
14, 2014), http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/koch (illustrating a $1,000,000 grant from the
Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce to the NRTWC).
54. Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2014).
55. Id. at 859.
56. Id. at 857–58.
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states with right-to-work legislation to bargain on behalf of only those workers who
join the union and pay dues; or (3) change NLRB law to allow unions to charge
non-dues paying nonmembers for the cost of representation in grievances and other
individualized contract administration matters.57 We believe our article will have
significant impact as states sort out the implications of new and existing right-towork laws.
In Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception?: When Government “Subsidies” Silence
Political Speech, Brian Olney argues that state laws restricting the way in which unions
collect voluntary political contributions from the workers they represent violates
the First Amendment.58 He demonstrates that state limits on payroll contributions
to fund union political speech pose an even greater threat to union political speech
than the rights of nonmembers to refuse to pay dues (or, in right-to-work states, to
pay anything for union representation) because payroll restriction laws limit speech
not just by nonmembers but also by union members who support their union’s
political activities.59 After a thorough analysis of Supreme Court and lower court
cases on the First Amendment protection for political contributions, including
through payroll deduction, Olney explains why laws restricting or prohibiting
payroll deductions for political activity are viewpoint discriminatory, are not
government subsidies, and regulate speech in designated public forums and,
therefore, violate the First Amendment.60
CONCLUSION
Of all the fundamental principles of labor law that are criticized in these
papers, two that emerge most often are the principles of exclusivity and majority
rule and, relatedly, the prohibition on employer bargaining with minority unions or
employer-dominated unions. Dimick speculates that exclusive representation, union
security, and the prohibition on employer-dominated unions play some role, but
not a determinative one, in sustaining the U.S. regime of decentralized bargaining.61
Rosado Marzán urges in this paper and elsewhere that the strictures of section
8(a)(2) be relaxed in order to allow unions—even the United Auto Workers at the
Volkswagen factory in Tennessee—to enter into contracts with willing employers
before majority status is established so that at least those employees who wish to
have union representation can have it.62 Crain and Matheny note that “a robust
freedom of assembly doctrine could be deployed to challenge the majority rule and
exclusivity doctrines,” as well as the ban on company unions, but they do not find

57. Id. at 859–60, 879.
58. Brian Olney, Note, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When Government “Subsidies” Silence
Political Speech, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 881, 886–87 (2014).
59. Id. at 894–95.
60. Id. at 936.
61. Dimick, supra note 33, at 705–06.
62. See Rosado Marzán, supra note 37, at 772.
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that prospect to be troublesome.63 As they say, “union organizing would no longer
be an all-or-nothing proposition: unions might gain a foothold in some workplaces
where they are unable to mobilize a majority of the workers.”64 Sachs and I argue
the same thing, at least for right-to-work states, and likewise find some benefit in
allowing those employees who want a union to have one regardless of whether a
majority of their coworkers share their preference.65
On this, as on every issue addressed in this symposium, the articles argue the
benefits of experimentalism. That willingness to try new ideas reflects what is
already going on in the world. Workers—with and without the assistance of
unions—are trying all sorts of strategies to find common cause with their colleagues,
community members, consumers, and others. The scholars and activists who
participated in the symposium are reimagining labor law in a huge variety of ways
and imagination is the first step on a path of modest (or radical) change.
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Crain & Matheny, supra note 3, at 604.
Id. at 605.
Fisk & Sachs, supra note 54, at 867.
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